

Peiping assumes a categorical stance on the questions of socialist unity, on the basis of a sharp definition of the current international situation, and the dominant role of the party.

The effect of these consistencies are obvious enough. In addition, it seems to indicate a trend away from liberalization within the bloc and a tightening up all along the line. There are indications also that the demise of liberalization, however, ran a slower course within China itself.

In the last analysis, this then is simply what the Chinese Communists probably saw as the most sensible course to take, in line with the realities of the situation and their own interests (in which ideology plays a part). The very fact that the Peiping declaration was subject to varied interpretation underscores its ambivalent nature. And its equivocal position underlies the impression that the Chinese leadership was publicly scratching its head, pondering out loud the various alternatives it faced. The Chinese regime was unquestionably scared by the Hungarian events. They had not expected it to go so far. Neither were they reassured in their domestic position by the clear evidences of dissatisfaction and unrest within.

This is supported by numerous signs of intellectual and student activity and unrest. Indeed, Mao himself refers quite openly, in his February address, to restiveness among the intellectuals. In addition, September and November had seen discussions on the role of democratic parties in the Chinese press, and of the multi-party system as well.

Some index to the CCP concern over student disquiet can be gathered from the heightened pace of editorial activity by the ChungKuo ChingNien Pao (China's Youth Newspaper), the official youth publication of the Communist regime. Numerous pieces are direct appeals for understanding the lessons of the Hungarian events, as the regime sees them. One example of this is a November editorial which says in part: "From the Hungarian incident we can see clearly that democracy

should have a certain sphere. Not realizing the sphere of democracy, the Nagy government gave way to and carried out a 'benevolent' policy toward counter-revolutionaries....democracy is applied to the people and dictatorship must be applied vis-a-vis counter-revolutionaries." <sup>34</sup>

The Chinese regime was beginning to realize the real dangers of the East European crisis, especially when compounded by the unexpected zeal with which criticism of the party and the government had been carried out under the "Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom" campaign, since May, 1956. Therefore, this ambivalent quality of its position still leaves the final definitions and determinations to the Communist leadership alone, internally, and to a united socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union (and to a greater degree than ever before dependent on Peiping's support), internationally. It appears that faced with several dilemmas, the Chinese Communist leadership wasn't quite sure what to do. But, for the time being, they seemed willing to settle for a recognition, within well-defined limits, of a certain degree of internal autonomy, within the framework of socialist unity, as long as the image and stature of that unity remained unimpaired. That the future would bring a steady move in the direction of re-establishing the acceptance of a "single road to socialism" concept, is outside the bounds of this paper's discussion.

III

In attempting to point out historical corollaries in the experiences of nations and men, there are inherent limitations. Obviously, no two historical experiences in either case are identical. Indeed, it is this very fact that imposes the strain of national diversity and autonomy upon the concept of a monolithic, unified socialist camp. National leaders such as Mao Tse-tung, Wladyslaw Gomulka, and Imre Nagy have had to pay heed to the reality that the "creative experience of the Soviet Union" on the road to socialism is not necessarily a universal one.

To be sure, there are differences in both the historical periods, circumstances, and in their relationships with the Soviet Union, between China of the 1920-30's and Poland and Hungary of 1956-57. Communist theoreticians especially, I suppose, would point out that the historical context and hence meaning of the two periods in which these national Communist leaders operated were entirely different, and that therefore each had its own, and different, set of precepts and dictates. That, indeed, while the actions of Mao were those of a Communist leader seeking state power, i.e., <sup>(engaged in)</sup> a bourgeois-democratic revolution, Gomulka and Nagy were Communist leaders in power, and in countries which presumably were already building socialism.

But, in effect, it might also be maintained that Mao's efforts to obtain the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party were in fact similar to the quest for party leadership in which Gomulka and Nagy were engaged. That basically, what is involved is a struggle for power, both within the national party and with Moscow. Furthermore, it could also be proposed that the relationship between the CCP and the Comintern in the twenties and thirties was not unlike the later relationship between the Communist parties of Poland and Hungary with Moscow after 1948 and until some time after the death of Stalin in 1953.

*in June  
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It is not the intent here, however, to argue these differences and similarities. Rather, it is contended that the existence of such differences does not negate the presence of certain similarities in the past experience of the Chinese leader Mao; and that these similarities may have had a conditioning effect on Mao's thinking and attitudes in the fall of 1956 which contributed, at least in his initial orientation to the problem, to a more understanding and favorable response to the difficulties and efforts on the part of the Polish leader Gomulka, and for a time at least, the Hungarian leader Nagy.

Two problems of particular relevance to the recent events in Eastern Europe seem to emerge from an examination of Mao's past and the historical development of the CCP. These are the questions of an indigenous Communist leadership vis-a-vis Moscow and Soviet-trained national leaders, and of the concept of the road to socialism, again involving the question of the relationship of the national Communist movement with Moscow.

From almost the very beginning of the Chinese Communist Party, Comintern policies which were imposed upon the party leadership were a dismal, and nearly irrevocable, failure. As early as the Second Party Congress in 1922, the will of the Comintern was clamped down on the CCP leaders, a leadership which was changed and chosen with the moods and needs of Moscow. Though it is not necessary to discuss here in detail, it is useful to keep in mind the fact that Chinese policy became a pawn in the bitter rivalry between Stalin and Trotsky which took place during much of this period, and thus was consistently tailored not to the needs of the Chinese but specifically to the requirements of the Moscow combatants. The tragic results are well known.

When the Comintern delegate, Maring, forced the CCP Central Committee in 1922 to adopt his plan for having individual CCP members join the "multi-class" Kuomintang (KMT), it marked the end of an era in the history of Chinese Communism;

"the end of a period of youthful purism and isolation; for after August, 1922, purity of dogma yielded to practical compromise. This transformation was wrought by an outside force---by the first impact of Comintern discipline on the CCP leadership. " <sup>35</sup> The CCP-KMT alliance which followed was the first of the disastrous policies contrived by the Comintern to suit the needs of Moscow. But what is more significant, it perhaps served as an object lesson for future CCP rationalizations of their own when circumstances later dictated the choice between expedient practice and ideological purity.

During the ensuing years, Mao in effect stood opposed to the Comintern's chosen instruments in China. According to his own account, Mao's disagreements with the party leadership on agrarian policy began as early as 1925. <sup>36</sup> For example, when the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) in December, 1926, made explicit that revolutionary peasant committees were in themselves not enough, that the proletariat was the only class which could solve the agrarian question, Mao's response was silence. After the utter collapse of CCP alliances with first the "right-KMT" (which resulted in the near-annihilation of the party by Chiang Kai-shek's "white terror" campaigns and started the process of almost complete CCP alienation from the urban proletariat) and then the "left-KMT" Wuhan government, there followed the Comintern-created "Li Li-san line" of planned urban uprisings. Mao, however, persisted in organizing peasant armies in his home province of Hunan and in carrying out agrarian reforms. For his efforts he was several times reprimanded by the Central Committee for "deviations" and once even dismissed from his position as an alternate member of the Politburo, in November, 1927. <sup>37</sup>

From the First Congress of 1921 to the Fifth in 1927, the CCP hierarchy had never considered the peasantry a decisive factor in the Chinese revolution. Mao's efforts, and accomplishments, in organizing the Hunan peasantry, had not won him any key position in the party leadership. But while the

strength and prestige of the CCP continued to sink under the weight of the Comintern line in the final years of the twenties and early thirties, Mao's efforts in the Soviet areas of South China began to emerge as a powerful independent force in the Communist movement.

This served as the background for the climactic clash between Mao and other seasoned CCP veterans with Li Li-San's successor, Wang Ming and the "Returned Student Faction." In this conflict the lines can be clearly drawn in the clash between an indigenous, hardened leadership and a Moscow trained and controlled group of leaders. The "Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks" with Wang Ming (whose real name is Ch'en Shao-yü) as their acknowledged leader, had spent all the years since 1926 in study at the Sun Yat-sen Academy in Moscow. They had distinguished themselves, above all, by the ardor with which they had defended the Stalinist cause against all signs of heterodoxy.<sup>38</sup> And they had been far from the scene of some of the most bitter revolutionary battles. As related in Schwartz's book, "These fellows," he (Li Ang) said, "were all young students who...had made no contribution whatsoever to the revolution. While we were carrying on the revolution they were still suckling at their mothers' breasts...these men who were infants in terms of revolutionary background were now sent back to be leaders of the Chinese revolution!"<sup>39</sup>

The demise of the Shanghai-centered Wang Ming leadership, which constituted the official CCP hierarchy, and the subsequent acquisition of party control by Mao---though fascinating in and of itself---is extraneous to this discussion except in one detail. That point is the fact that in assuming the reins of control, Mao not only faced the opposition of a Soviet-backed and weaned faction, but also was forced to wind his way through a more complicated struggle with factions within the Soviet areas themselves.

The Wang Ming leadership, however, climaxes a series of Comintern impositions of policies and personnel upon the CCP.

It showed a blatant disregard for the indigenous leaders and capped a history of failure and frustration for Moscow and its China maneuvers. Thus, Mao had seen the repeated failure of the CCP in its effort to capture, or create its own, effective revolutionary movement. He had seen how the enormous "scissors" between the Comintern line and Chinese realities, and finally the putting into control of the party the "Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks" had gradually undermined the faith of party members---and had led to the disintegration of the CCP outside the Soviet areas he and his colleagues had built up in the Hunan-Kiangsi hinterland on the basis of an indigenous policy streamlined to fit the needs of Chinese conditions.

However, it should be noted that Mao remained relatively quiescent and aloof while he went his own way in the agrarian districts of the southern provinces and it may be presumed that he gave his formal approval to directives which probably ran contrary to his convictions. Mao's use of this guileful art is what the Chinese describe as "open respect, hidden rebellion." Such action may be regarded as good party discipline, but throughout the critical years of his rise to power, Mao proved a master in the use of sham compromise. This disposition may also hold relevance to Mao's thinking in 1956.

Thus, Mao Tse-tung and the core of the present CCP leadership, learned the hard way that "in spite of the Marxist claim to universality, it is evident that Marxism-Leninism has had its success in China roughly in proportion as it has fitted into the Chinese scene, adapted itself to Chinese needs and conditions, and taken advantage of specific Chinese opportunities." <sup>40</sup> From this experience can be drawn numerous corollaries to the East European situation of 1956, especially as it focuses on Poland and Wladyslaw Gomulka.

As Mao sat in Peiping during the fall of 1956, his conscious or subconscious reflections might have brought to mind the

following parallels as he sized up Gomulka and the Polish crisis; as Moscow-inspired Comintern policies had led to failure and near disaster for the CCP in China, so too in Poland was there a general backdrop of direction and practices which were not only inimical to Poland but had failed to gain popular support for the PUWP due to its failure to take into account national peculiarities (in historical terms relevant to Poland this analogy would include Soviet actions during World War II and the decimation of the entire Polish Communist Party in the purges of the 1930's); as Mao had recognized the need for and the applicability of paying heed to the special requirements of national conditions and environmental factors, so too had Gomulka pressed for and stuck to the proposition that Poland must follow its own "road to socialism;" consequently, as Mao had faced both personal humiliation and attack within the party and had faced the imposition of Soviet-trained and controlled party leadership, so too had Gomulka experienced similar, if not identical, <sup>situations and</sup> obstacles; and Gomulka, as Mao, likewise struggled back into the seat of leadership on the basis of his own beliefs and on the strength of indigenous support, both within and without the party.

And, perhaps what was the pivotal fact here, Mao and Gomulka also shared a common commitment to the tradition of Marxism-Leninism (as "subjective" as this might have been) and the willingness to, if not the firm belief in, operating within its framework, and hence to maintain the image and structure of socialist unity. Nor was there ever any question in either of their minds, concerning the role of the party in a dictatorship of the proletariat (though for Mao this took a somewhat different form in the character of the People's Democratic Dictatorship).

and  
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This last point serves as a useful point of departure for a look at the Chinese condemnation of Imre Nagy as a heretic. While Nagy probably shares most of the common characteristics noted above, his actions belie the necessity of adhering to "socialist discipline," or of bowing to the priorities of

maintaining socialist unity. And even, for that matter, of even ensuring the maintenance of power solely in the hands of the Communist party.

If one looks back into the formative years of the CCP and Mao's posture therein, it is also possible to discern proof of the emphasis which Mao and his colleagues place on these vital issues. It points up the fact that even in the turbulence and uncertainty of the 1920-30's there was a point beyond which Mao would not step, a point where the interests of "socialist unity" assumed top priority.

It has already been pointed out that in the face of demands for obedience to the Comintern, the theoretically-minded founders of the CCP toed the Moscow line as early as 1922 in order to avert a split with the socialist motherland. It has also been mentioned that Mao, throughout his rise to power and his employment of policies and practices which in reality ran counter to and denied the primacy of Moscow, not to speak of Marxist doctrine, did not openly break with but outwardly gave deference to the Comintern line. But, probably, the Sian Incident in 1936 most poignantly illustrates the importance placed by Mao on the need for ultimate unity in the ranks, without as well as within.

This episode, which occurred in late December of that year, must itself be viewed in the context of Mao's resistance to the united front "from above" tactics laid down at the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935. While steps had been taken towards the middle of 1936, and after, toward a rapprochement between the CCP and the KMT for an "anti-Japanese united front," the dramatic Sian coup served as a climax and a catharsis for these maneuvers. Sian brought into the open the impatience of the Comintern with Mao's reticence in carrying out the strategy evoked by the Seventh Congress.

As is indicated by Mao's own writings in late 1935 and early 1936, he resolutely opposed any alliance with Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT leadership. In fact, Mao's priorities seemed to clearly place the destruction of the Nanking regime

above the halting of the Japanese aggression.<sup>41</sup> Indeed, even after the Comintern meeting during the summer of 1935, CCP hostility to the KMT leaders remained sufficiently strong to require direct Comintern intervention before they were willing to compromise with the erstwhile "national traitors."<sup>42</sup> (And, ironically, it was Wang Ming himself, since disposed leader of the CCP and whom Mao had replaced, and now the CCP delegate to the Comintern, who pushed the new united front line from Moscow.)

In brief, during a visit to Sian to investigate the military situation there, Chiang was captured by his own troops in a protest against delays in earnestly meeting the Japanese encroachments. Hoping to establish some kind of synthesis from such a meeting, the rebels notified the CCP leaders who immediately rushed to the scene. With Chou En-lai as the chief Communist representative on the spot, it is clear that the inclination to do away with Chiang was great. During the ensuing days, the fate of the Nationalist commander was precarious, and there is even evidence of plans for a "mass trial of Chiang as a traitor."<sup>43</sup> Moscow, however, took a quite different view of the whole matter.

In line with its united front "from above" strategy composed in the face of increasing fascist dangers on two fronts, Moscow directly intervened in what must have been a great temptation on the part of the CCP to eliminate their arch-enemy. To Moscow, this was a "plot against the process of China's unification," which "could only benefit Japanese imperialism."<sup>44</sup> From accumulated evidence, there appears to be a strong case supporting the fact that a telegram direct from Stalin to Mao at this crucial juncture stated that unless Chiang was released the Chinese Communists would be condemned as bandits and repudiated.<sup>45</sup>

There is here the outline of a case of the direct imposition of Moscow views, in an effort to gain and secure a Comintern policy opposed by indigenous party leaders. On December 24, Chiang was released and given his freedom. It

is clear that Mao bowed to Moscow and to "socialist discipline." While Mao's acquiescence proved to be only temporary in nature, the immediate alternatives and decisions of the Sian affair might still be relevant in casting light on Mao's later reactions to a situation in Hungary which bore many of the same principles.

Perhaps the basic concept to bear in mind in this historical exercise is the fact that Moscow emerges as the common factor, or irritant. The common denominator throughout is the role of the Soviet Union as an agent intensifying the struggle for leadership and control in national Communist parties. It, furthermore, may serve to suggest once again that the CCP does possess a consciousness of national diversity which is absent from the Soviet perspective, or at least appeared to be absent in its relations with Eastern Europe after World War II and its ascendancy to dominance in the area. But it must be remembered as well, that Mao has shown his conservative as well as his rebel strains.

What is suggested here, in essence, is the introduction of a personal factor, the human element which cannot be excluded from any assessment of political behavior, and which sometimes plays a part far out of proportion to its place <sup>(even)</sup> in a power-ideology perspective.

IV

In June of 1949, three months before the Communist regime was officially declared in Peiping, Mao Tse-tung set forth his well-known "lean to one side policy," leaving little doubt as to China's posture as a full-fledged (even if not fully "recognized") participant in the international arena. In part he said:

"(We are told) 'You are leaning to one side.' Exactly....In order to attain victory and consolidate it, we must lean to one side....The Chinese people must lean either to the side of imperialism or to that of Socialism. There can be no exception. There can be no sitting on the fence; there is no third path...Internationally we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union." 46

Though the importance for the Chinese Communists of such an alliance have waned since its earlier years, its status and role in that "front" has steadily and increasingly grown in significance, not only for the Chinese themselves but for the Communist world. Since the unsure years of the early fifties, the CCP has gained in name, if not in reality, a stature as co-leader of the Communist bloc. This, in addition to ideological commitment and certain practical needs, has given the present regime a certain vested interest in the maintenance and continuation of "socialist unity;" both as a viable center for its own support, and as a viable center of power for the forward progress of the movement itself. Therefore, the CCP leadership was, and is, deeply involved in and concerned with any disturbing or weakening signs within that camp as a whole. It only follows that it was deeply interested in the East European crisis in 1956.

That the Chinese are to some degree dependent on the existence of a strong and stable socialist camp, whether this be under the strict ideological and power ties of Stalinism

or under a looser form of "Socialist Commonwealth of States," for the achievement of certain aims and the satisfaction of certain needs, has been frequently pointed out. The range of factors usually covered include diplomatic, economic, military, strategic and ideological considerations, and have been examined both in terms of divisive and unifying effects. They need not be belabored here. <sup>47</sup>

In placing the East European events in a sharper Chinese focus, however, it may be useful to briefly consider a few additional points.

It should be remembered that East European developments held equal meaning for the CCP hierarchy internally, particularly during the time which they took place. The country was in the midst of the "Hundred Flowers" movement, a fact which must have proved most unsettling to the party leadership in light of the extent and nature of the criticism leveled at the regime. This is underscored by the fact that the regime did not feel willing, or able, to stem the tide of the movement for a full year after it had begun. And when it did, it felt the need to accomplish this with a full-scale "rectification" campaign, or Cheng Feng Movement.

*Handwritten notes:* No - this is right!

The year 1956 also was a year of the "big push forward" in the economy of China. There was at this time a highly accelerated nationalization of the economy, involving both the collectivization of agriculture and the state takeover of the remaining remnants of private industry. The resultant surge in organization and investment meant the placing of additional burdens on the economy and on the people. This could hardly be expected not to cause a certain amount of tension and strain on the Chinese domestic scene. Perhaps, in light of the economic aspects of the outcries in Eastern Europe, the fact that 1957 was a year of retrenchment by the Chinese Communists was dictated by more than economic evaluations alone.

In addition to popular, particularly intellectual and student, unrest, and economic stress during this crucial period,

there were also, to an indeterminate degree, certain military and political diversions internally. This general period marks the culmination of a two-year Chinese Communist effort to deepen its influence and broaden its control in Tibet, occupied by the Chinese military since 1950. Reports from China at this time not only indicate a general failure in this effort but the necessity for using heavy armaments to keep the situation under control.

There has been some suggestion as well of political troubles within the CCP hierarchy itself, an ostensibly rare phenomenon indeed. The basis for such speculation focuses on the 1955 purge from high party ranks of veteran leaders Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih.<sup>48</sup> Conclusions drawn from what information is available, point to the likelihood of a power struggle within the party which has existed since 1953 and which centers about <sup>(who is to be)</sup> the successor to Mao Tse-tung.<sup>49</sup> It is impossible <sup>(to)</sup> assess a weight of importance to this factor, except to mention it as a part of the "objective" situation. It is interesting to note, with regard to this, that some observers have apparently viewed the Kao-Jao "plot" as an attempt on the part of a pro-Soviet clique within the CCP to undermine either the present leadership, or the likely successors to the present leadership. The conflict has been cast in terms of trying to discredit an alleged indigenous policy not in harmony with the desires of Moscow.<sup>50</sup>

There is, finally, at least one other approach from which to look at the Chinese Communist cosmos of 1956. This is in the perspective of China's position in, and relation to, the rest of Asia (and indeed, an emerging Africa). China today wears many different "hats" in its external relations. At least three of these have an Asian tint to them.

China must consider its posture in relation to its own, however small, "satellite" appendages in the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of (North) Korea; its relations with other Communist parties in Asia (and Overseas Chinese as potential sources of independent

strength and as allies of Communist movements in those countries); and its position vis-a-vis the non-Communist, and largely uncommitted, nation-states of Asia. Finally, whether admitted or not, is the fact that in many Asian and African eyes, Communist China is today competing with non-Communist India as representatives of two alternative ~~of~~ models for economic development and of entrance into the modern age (and by implication, a new world order).

In all of these instances, China's posture is of great importance. The image which it projects beyond its borders is, in general, not one only as a nation-state facing and attempting to solve problems facing two-thirds of the world today, but also as a part, and an influential member, of the Communist bloc of nations. In a sense, China is Communism's showcase for all underdeveloped countries. If we assume that China desires to expand its influence, which seems a minimal assumption in view of the fact that this does not necessarily connote military expansion, and believes in the inevitable march of history towards world Communism, the greater appears its need for maintaining a definite kind of profile.

In this light, it might be useful to take a second look at Chou En-lai's message to the Asian countries he visited in November and December, 1956. The emphasis placed on the "error" of "big-nation chauvinism" and the firm backing of the "five principles" as a basis for international relations, seems to infer that the Chinese had more concern for their position vis-a-vis areas outside their direct control or influence than those within this area. In essence, what worried Peiping most was not the reflection its response to the East European crisis would cast over its so-called "satellites," or the border areas where it already exercises hegemony, but with the effect it would have upon non-Communist Asia.

China, in line with the "special" position the Communist camp generally acknowledges it to have in Asia, sought to maintain, and possibly to strengthen, that role. The CCP apparently recognized the need to present to sensitive Asian leaders, whose countries and people for the most part are presently

Good point

emerging from the limitations, frustrations and humiliation of foreign control, or domination, a picture of moderation and good-will. And it is possible, from a review of some Polish statements made at this time, that in exchange for Chinese support in its struggle with the Soviet Union, the Poles in turn made some remarks clearly earmarked for Asian consumption.

In an article from Warsaw in late December, the NY Times reports Polish sources as crediting the Chinese Communists with a moderating influence on international Communism specifically, and the international scene generally. Moreover, the Poles continued, Chinese Communist theory and practice contain a form of humanism absent from Soviet practice. What's more, in the Polish view, this called for a reassessment of China in world affairs.<sup>48</sup> This, of course, has to be viewed as well in light of the Polish anticipation of Chou's visit to Moscow and Warsaw, but this doesn't detract from any impact it may have had in Asia.

*you  
should not  
take much  
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uncritically.  
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wishful-thinking*

At the same time, in its support and interpretation of Soviet intervention in Hungary, China may have sacrificed certain short-term advantages in its Asian position for what it may have considered more strategic long-range benefits. It is undoubtedly held to by the CCP leadership that its long-run influence, and prestige (as well as its claims to legitimacy as a member of the "family of nations"), in the emerging areas of the globe, will be enhanced to the degree that that part of humanity is presented with the imposing image of a constantly expanding, unified and progressive "socialist camp," relentlessly, indeed inevitably, winning the world. Placing the responsibility for violence and upheaval in Hungary on the shoulders of imperialism (a task made easier, unfortunately, due to the Western engagement in Suez), fitted CCP needs as well as its ideological bent. Not only could the Soviet action be rationalized, but another blow could be struck at the forces of imperialism, a phenomenon not far from the

minds and experience of most Asians. Moreover, by virtue of the synonamous way in which the CCP use the words imperialism and the United States, the Chinese could find another channel for discrediting the main physical deterrent to its ambitions and freedom of movemant in Asia and the Formosa Strait.

As an added thought, applied internally, the CCP interpretation of the Hungarian affair might possibly <sup>(have)</sup> been served up by the regime in an attempt to help allay internal strains. The CCP propaganda machines doubtlessly unrolled reams of material pointing to the fresh "dangers of aggression" emanating from a hostile imperialist bloc. And thus, could exercise a much needed instrument for seeking increased conformity and unity within China, as well as within the Communist camp as a whole, in face of the "external threat." A useful tool, indeed, to channel off (or bludgeon) some of the dissenting sentiment which seemingly was converging on Communism from all sides in the final weeks of 1956.

# FOOTNOTES

1. Survey of China Mainland Press, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, (hereafter cited as Survey), No. 1419, Ta Kung Pao, Peiping, November 13, 1956.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. New York (NY) Times, October 26, 1956.
16. Survey, No. 1405, op.cit., NCNA, Peiping, November 1, 1956.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Survey, No. 1418, op.cit., JenMin JihPao, Peiping, Nov. 10, 1956.
23. NY Times, Oct. 16, 1956. (Reported by Sidney Gruson).
24. NY Times, Nov. 12, 1956. (Reported by Flora Lewis).

FOOTNOTES (2)

25. The "Five Principles" were first put forward by Nikita Khrushchev at the Geneva Conference in 1954. They were subsequently endorsed by Chou En-lai and Indian Premier Nehru and incorporated into a list of ten resolutions adopted at the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, 1955.
26. NY Times, Nov. 22, 1956. Quoting Peiping Radio.
27. Survey, No. 1406, op.cit., JenMin JihPao editorial, Peiping, Nov. 3, 1956.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Survey, No. 1418, op.cit., JenMin JihPao, Peiping, Nov. 21, 1956.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. NY Times, November 29, 1957.
34. Survey, No. 1422, op.cit., ChungKuo ChingNien Pao, Peiping, November 17, 1956.
35. Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, John K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (hereafter cited as Doc. Hist.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1952, page 54.
36. Ibid., page 78.
37. Ibid., page 126.
38. Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, Harvard University Press, 1952, page 148.
39. Ibid., page 149.
40. Brandt, et.al, Doc. Hist., op.cit., page 13.
41. Reports on China, Volume II: James C. Thomson, Jr., Communist Policy and the United Front in China, 1935-36, from the East Asia Regional Studies Program, a Master's Thesis, Harvard University, page 116-17.
42. Ibid., page 114.
43. Ibid., page 135.

FOOTNOTES (3)

44. Ibid., page 135.
45. Ibid., page 136.
46. Peter T'ang, Communist China Today, Frederrick A Praeger, New York, 1956, page 378-79. (Hereafter cited as Comm. Ch.)
47. For references dealing with this question, see: W.W. Rostow, and others, The Prospects for Communist China, The Technology Press, 1954; Howard L. Boorman, A. Eckstein, P. Mosely & B. Schwartz, Moscow-Peking Axis, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations, Harper & Bros., New York, 1957; Soviet Satellite Nations, John Hallowell, ed., Kallman Publishing Co., Gainesville, Florida, 1958. See article by Allen S. Whiting, "Contradictions in the Moscow-Peking Axis."
48. See accounts of Kao-Jao purge in T'ang, Ch. Comm., op.cit.; and Far Eastern Survey, January, 1957, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, Harold C. Hinton, The Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. (hereafter cited as Eighth Congress).
49. Hinton, Eighth Congress, op.cit.
50. T'ang, Ch. Comm., op.cit., page 81-84. Note: T'ang, for one, rejects this thesis, in general.
51. NY Times, December 25, 1956. (Reported by M.S. Handler).

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